And to Your Left You\u27ll See... : Licensed Tour Guides, The First Amendment, and the Free Market by Tracy, Kristin
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 1 Article 6
2016
"And to Your Left You'll See...": Licensed Tour
Guides, The First Amendment, and the Free
Market
Kristin Tracy
University of Baltimore School of Law, kristin.tracy@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tracy, Kristin (2016) ""And to Your Left You'll See...": Licensed Tour Guides, The First Amendment, and the Free Market," University




“AND TO YOUR LEFT YOU’LL SEE . . .”: LICENSED TOUR 
GUIDES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE FREE MARKET 
Kristin Tracy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
If you are a beer-lover visiting Washington, D.C., you might want 
to check out “DC Brew Tours,” a “beer tour company in the Capital 
region that offers daily brewery tours to Washington’s best breweries, 
brewpubs, and bars.”1  As you would expect, the tour includes 
samples of beer from a number of local craft breweries, as well as 
information about how each beer is made.2  What you might not 
expect, however, is that, until very recently, DC Brew tour guides 
were legally obligated to pass a written exam about the history of 
D.C., a topic which has little to do with the art of brewing craft beer, 
in order to obtain a license before providing any paid tours.3   
When you think about the First Amendment and about those 
figures who helped challenge and shape First Amendment 
jurisprudence throughout history, who do you think of?  Young men 
burning their draft cards,4 newspapers challenging prior restraint,5 
students wearing armbands in protest,6 and, of course, tour guides.  
Yes, you read that correctly, tour guides.   The freedom of speech is 
“America’s favorite freedom,”7 so when a law or a case erodes that 
freedom, it is important to pay attention.   
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2017. 
1. DC Brew Tours, https://dcbrewtours.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  
2. Id.  
3. See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 19, § 1200.1 (2010) (amended 2015) (defining a tour 
guide, subject to the licensing requirements, as “any person who engages primarily 
in the business of guiding or directing people to any place or point of interest in the 
District . . . concerning any place or point of interest in the District”).  
4. See generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that a criminal 
prohibition against burning a draft card did not violate the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech). 
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota 
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
6. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(holding that a group of students wearing armbands in school to protest U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam represented constitutionally protected symbolic speech). 
7. Ken Paulson, America’s Favorite Freedom, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/americas-favorite-freedom. 
170 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
It is probably fair to assume that most of the people reading this 
Comment are not tour guides, but that does not mean that this issue 
should be glanced over.  The instant cases deal with tour guides,8 but 
the next plaintiff could be a journalist, a comedian, an author, or a 
film-maker, because these cases are not just about tour guides, they 
are about professional speakers.9 
This Comment analyzes the lack of necessity for, and therefore, the 
unconstitutionality of, tour guide licensing through the lens of two 
recent cases: Kagan v. City of New Orleans10 and Edwards v. District 
of Columbia.11  The court in Edwards struck down the District of 
Columbia’s licensing requirement as a violation of the First 
Amendment,12 whereas the Kagan court came to the opposite 
conclusion.13  Section II provides a foundation for understanding the 
courts’ analyses of regulations affecting free speech, as well as the 
factual and procedural backgrounds of the two cases.14  Section III 
asserts that the court in Edwards is correct—the licensing 
requirements for tour guides do little to serve the government interest 
of protecting the tourism industry, while another tool is much more 
effective: the free market.15  I will explain the basic economic 
theories, which will then be applied to show how the tour guide 
industry is more than capable of regulating itself.16  Finally, Section 
IV will discuss the unfortunate potential for further speech restriction 
if the Kagan camp gains more support.17   
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
A number of controversial and groundbreaking claims have been 
brought in the name of freedom of speech.18  This can be largely 
attributed to two factors.  First, as mentioned above,19 Americans 
highly value the protections afforded by the First Amendment.  
 
8. See infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
9. Id. 
10. Kagan v. City of New Orleans (Kagan II), 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014). 
11. Edwards v. District of Columbia (Edwards III), 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
12. Id. at 998 (“Finding the record wholly devoid of evidence supporting the burdens the 
challenged regulations impose on Appellants’ speech, we reverse and remand.”).  
13. Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 562 (“The judgment of the district court upholding the 
constitutionality of the New Orleans licensing scheme for tour guides is affirmed.”).  
14. See infra Part II.  
15. Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1005 (“Even if we indulged the District's apparently active 
imagination, the record is equally wanting of evidence the exam regulation actually 
furthers the District's interest in preventing the stated harms.”).  
16. See infra Part III.   
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See, e.g., supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.   
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Second, those highly valued protections do not always have a clear 
definition or application.20  The First Amendment does not provide 
an absolute freedom,21 and courts have to determine when and where 
to draw the line.22  The two recent cases of focus here, Kagan and 
Edwards, involve two courts looking at very similar facts, and 
deciding to draw the line at different places.23  One of those lines, if 
left unchecked, threatens to infringe upon the rights of speakers 
wherever a business relationship is involved.24 
A. Speech Restriction in General 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech.”25  While the text of the First 
Amendment only refers to Congress, the Supreme Court has deemed 
that the protections apply to the governments of individual states, as 
well.26  Whether dealing with federal or state laws, the Supreme 
Court has the daunting task of defining and categorizing different 
types of speech,27 and developing tests to determine when a speech 
restriction does or does not violate the First Amendment.28 
For the purpose of analyzing Kagan29 and Edwards,30 it is 
important to understand two categories of speech restrictions and 
 
20. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
21. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.   
22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.  
23. See infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
24. See infra Sections II.B, II.C 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
26. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we 
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by 
the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).  
27. See, e.g., id. at 664.  
28. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (finding a city’s 
sound amplification guidelines to be valid as constitutional time, place, or manner 
restrictions because the regulations were content-neutral, served an important 
government interest, were narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternative means 
for communicating the same message); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) 
(holding that burning the U.S. flag is a protected form of symbolic speech); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (developing the “Clear and Present 
Danger test” to determine whether or not the Constitution allows for restriction of 
high-value political speech); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) 
(developing the four-prong “O’Brien test” to decide whether a content-neutral 
regulation on expressive speech is constitutionally valid); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. 
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (holding that prior restraints on speech are 
unconstitutional).  
29.  Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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their corresponding tests: certain restrictions on symbolic speech, and 
time, place, or manner restrictions.31  In United States v. O’Brien, the 
Supreme Court created a four-prong test to determine the 
constitutionality of content-neutral regulations of symbolic speech:32   
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.33 
The Court explained in O’Brien that not every act is considered 
protected speech, but that certain actions include “communicative 
element[s]” important enough to “bring into play the First 
Amendment.”34  Prongs two and four of the test ask the court to 
decide whether or not a regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
serve a substantial government interest.35  In doing this, the Court in 
O’Brien questioned the existence of “alternative means that would 
more precisely and narrowly assure” the achievement of the State’s 
goal.36  If such alternative means do exist, the regulation will fail.37   
Another category of speech restriction regulates the time, place, or 
manner of speech.38  The First Amendment protects the freedom of 
speech, but this freedom is not absolute: “the First Amendment does 
not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and 
 
30. Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).   
31. Id. at 1009; Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 562. 
32. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.  After burning his card outside of the South Boston 
Courthouse, O’Brien was convicted under the Universal Military Training and 
Services Act, which prohibited the destruction of a draft card.  Id. at 369 (“[H]e had 
burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was 
violating federal law.”). 
33. Id. at 377.   
34. Id. at 376.  
35. Id. at 377; see also Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1002 (“Collectively, prongs two and 
four of the O’Brien test query whether the challenged regulations are narrowly 
tailored to further a substantial government interest.”).   
36. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381.   
37. Id.  
38. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989) (challenging the 
constitutionality of a city’s sound-amplification guidelines); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota 
law prohibiting the distribution of literature at the State Fair except at designated 
booths).   
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places or in any manner that may be desired.”39  Like those speech 
restrictions tested under O’Brien,40 time, place, or manner regulations 
must not be based on the content or subject-matter of the speech.41  
The restriction must also “serve a significant governmental 
interest,”42 must be narrowly tailored to serve that significant 
interest,43 and must leave open “alternative forums for the expression 
of . . . protected speech.”44   
Although they have different names and seemingly different 
requirements, the line separating the above-mentioned tests has been 
somewhat blurred.45  In Clark v. Community for Non-Violence, the 
Supreme Court explained that: 
[If a time, place, or manner restriction] sufficiently and 
narrowly serves a substantial enough governmental interest 
to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to 
invalidate it under O'Brien on the ground that the 
governmental interest is insufficient to warrant the intrusion 
on First Amendment concerns or that there is an inadequate 
nexus between the regulation and the interest sought to be 
served. We note that only recently, in a case dealing with 
the regulation of signs, the Court framed the issue under 
O'Brien and then based a crucial part of its analysis on the 
time, place, or manner cases.46 
Essentially, time, place, or manner restrictions “must also satisfy the 
O’Brien standard.”47  The integration of these two speech regulation 
tests48 is exemplified in two recent cases dealing with the 
constitutionality of licensing requirements for paid tour guides.49   
 
39. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647 (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966)).  
40. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  
41. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
530, 536 (1980)).  
42. Id. (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976)).  
43. Id. at 658 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972)).  
44. Id. at 654.  
45. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984); see 
also Angelica M. Sinopole, Comment, “No Saggy Pants”: A Review of the First 
Amendment Issues Presented by the State’s Regulation of Fashion in Public Streets, 
113 PA. ST. L. REV. 329, 358 n.198 (2008).   
46. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 n.8 (citing City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 804–05, 808–10 (1984)).  
47. Sinopole, supra note 45.  
48. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 174–75 (2015) (“[Edwards] instead employs an eccentric 
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B. Kagan v. City of New Orleans50 
In 2013, a group of New Orleans tour guides challenged their city’s 
licensing requirement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana.51  These original plaintiffs (now appellants) 
gave a variety of tours, ranging from historical, to ghost-themed, to 
“gustatory or libationary.”52  New Orleans City Code § 30-1551 
required tour guides in the City to have a license,53 § 30-1553 
required the license applicant to pass a written examination and to 
have committed no felonies in the past five years,54 and § 30-1557 
codified the fifty dollar fee applicants must pay before obtaining a 
license.55   
The city asserted that the license requirement ensured tour guides’ 
knowledge of New Orleans and protected tourists from criminals and 
swindlers.56  The tour guides argued that the City’s justifications 
were “insufficient under the First Amendment,” and asked for a 
 
form of ‘intermediate scrutiny’ fashioned by cobbling together elements of the 
O’Brien test with criteria developed in the context of content-neutral ‘time, place and 
manner’ regulations.”) (citation omitted).  
49. There is an argument, and perhaps a better one, that the O’Brien test has no 
applicability in the tour guide cases since O’Brien is applied to symbolic speech 
restrictions.  See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.  If a tour guide’s speech 
is viewed as strictly commercial speech (i.e., it has no symbolic or expressive 
nature), then an analysis under O’Brien is improper.  See, e.g., Post & Shanor, supra 
note 48, at 165–66.  But see Recent Case, First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—
D.C. Circuit Court Holds Unconstitutional District of Columbia’s Tour Guide 
Licensing Regulation—Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 
2014)., 128 HARV. L. REV. 777, 781 (2014) (“The Edwards court was correct to 
recognize the constitutional interest at stake because the D.C. regulation necessarily 
affected expressive speech.”).  The bottom line is that it does not really matter which 
test should have been applied.  As explained above, there is a strong suggestion that 
the end result is the same regardless of whether the O’Brien test or the time, place, or 
manner test is applied.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.   
50. Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014).  
51. See generally Kagan v. City of New Orleans (Kagan I), 957 F. Supp. 2d 774 (E.D. 
La. 2013) (holding the city’s licensing scheme for tour guides did not violate the 
First Amendment).  
52. Id. at 774.  
53. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-1551 (2011) (“No person shall 
conduct tours for hire in the parish who does not possess a tour guide license issued 
by the department of safety and permits.”).    
54. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-1553 (2011) (“The written 
examination is designed to test the applicant’s knowledge of the historical, cultural 
and sociological developments and points of interest in the city.”). 
55. NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-1557 (2011). 
56. Kagan I, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 775–76.  The court later explained, however, that “[a] 
tour guide may say whatever he or she wishes about a site, or anything else for that 
matter—the City does not regulate the content of tour guides’ speech.”  Id. at 779.  
These two statements are incompatible.   
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declaratory judgment and permanent injunction.57  The district court 
held that the challenged statutes were content-neutral and valid under 
the O’Brien test,58 in part reasoning that the “[p]laintiffs do not need 
a license to speak and lead tours whenever, wherever, and containing 
whatever they please, just so long as they do not charge for them.”59  
There was no serious doubt regarding the city’s police power, in this 
situation, fulfilling the first prong of the test, since “[t]he City 
unquestionably has the power to license businesses as part of its 
police powers.”60   
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling in a 
brief opinion.61  The court emphasized the fact that the tour guides’ 
speech was not restricted at all once they obtained a license, 
affirming the district court’s O’Brien analysis: that New Orleans’ 
regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored.62  Immediately following 
this discussion, however, the Fifth Circuit went on to explain how 
“instructive” the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism63 was in this particular case:64   
There the government had regulated sound, and the Court 
said that even with messages conveyed, the regulation is 
content-neutral so long as the regulation is justified without 
reference to content or speech.  Because that regulation was 
content-neutral and only reviewed with intermediate 
scrutiny, it satisfied the requirement of narrow tailoring so 
long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.65  
The court’s reliance on this authority is notable because, as discussed 
above,66 the Ward case dealt with a time, place, or manner 
 
57. Id. at 776.  
58. Id. at 780–82.   
59. Id. at 781–82 (citation omitted) (referring to a combination of the second and fourth 
prongs of the O’Brien test—whether or not the regulation furthers a substantial 
government interest, and whether or not the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is essential to the furtherance of that interest).   
60. Id. at 780.   
61. Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014).  
62. Id. at 562 (“[T]he New Orleans law in its requirements for a license has no effect 
whatsoever on the content of what tour guides say.”).  
63. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
64. Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 562.   
65. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
66. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.   
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restriction.67  As previously explained, however, the Supreme Court 
has asserted that the outcome may be the same no matter which test a 
court uses (i.e., O’Brien or time, place, or manner).68  Following the 
district court’s ruling, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of 
certiorari on February 23, 2015.69 
C. Edwards v. District of Columbia70 
Plaintiffs Tonia Edwards and Bill Main, owners of “Segs in the 
City,” a tour-guide company operating in D.C., Baltimore, and 
Annapolis, first challenged the constitutionality of the District’s 
statutory licensing requirement in 2010.71  Plaintiffs filed for a 
preliminary injunction, while the District simultaneously filed a 
motion to dismiss.72  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia denied both motions in 2011.73  Both parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment, and in 2013, the district court again 
issued an opinion on the matter, this time finding for the District of 
Columbia.74 
The challenged statute was strikingly similar to the New Orleans 
statutes challenged in Kagan;75 it required all paid tour guides to 
obtain licenses from the District of Columbia for an annual fee of 
twenty-eight dollars.76  D.C. Municipal Regulations accompanied this 
statute, and provided that a license applicant must “[n]ot have been 
convicted of [certain specified felonies],”77 and must “pass an 
examination . . . covering the applicant’s knowledge of buildings and 
points of historical and general interest in the District,”78 among other 
 
67. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum 
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech . . . . ”).   
68. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.    
69. Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1403 (2015).  
70. Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).    
71. Edwards v. District of Columbia (Edwards I), 765 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2011).    
72. Id. at 6. 
73. Id.  The cases Edwards I and Edwards II were later consolidated, and Edwards I was 
dismissed as moot by the D.C. Circuit Court, so I will be focusing more on the 
opinions in Edwards II & III.  See Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1000 n.2.  
74. Edwards v. District of Columbia (Edwards II), 943 F. Supp. 2d 109, 124–25 (D.D.C. 
2013), rev’d, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).   
75. Compare id., with Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 2014).  
76. D.C. CODE § 47-2836(a) (2012).   
77. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 19, § 1203.1(c) (2015). 
78. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 19, § 1203.3 (2010) (repealed 2015).  On top of the annual 
licensing fee, this written examination cost $200 for first-time applicants.  Edwards 
II, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 114.   
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requirements.79  Just like the plaintiffs in Kagan,80 the plaintiffs in 
Edwards claimed that requiring a paid tour guide to first obtain a 
license is a violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.81  The court applied the O’Brien test82 and found for the 
city, granting its motion for summary judgment.83  Of particular 
importance is the district court’s analysis of the fit of the 
regulations,84 where the court determined that “[t]he tour guide 
licensing provisions do not burden substantially more expression than 
is necessary to meet the District's regulatory goals.”85 
Kagan and Edwards diverged once Edwards reached the D.C. 
Circuit Court.86  Again, there was no debate as to whether or not the 
regulation “is within the constitutional power of the Government.”87  
The disagreement derived from prongs two and four of the O’Brien 
test.88  While the Fifth Circuit pointed to the lack of regulation or 
control of tour guides’ speech once they obtained a license as proof 
of the regulation’s appropriate fit,89 the D.C. court came to the 
opposite conclusion, stating that “a regulation cannot be sustained ‘if 
there is little chance that the restriction will advance the State’s 
goal.’”90  The court went further, and asked: “Exactly how does a 
tour guide with carte blanche to—Heaven forfend—call the White 
House the Washington Monument further the District's interest in 
ensuring a quality consumer experience?”91   
 
79. See generally D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 19, §§ 1200–1209 (2010) (amended 2015) 
(outlining the requirements for obtaining a tour guide license). 
80. Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 561. 
81. Edwards II, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 114–15.  
82. Id. at 117, 121–24 (“The government has greater latitude to enact laws that only 
incidentally restrict speech, and such laws are reviewed under an intermediate 
scrutiny test.” (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968))).  
83. Id. at 124–25.   
84. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(“Collectively, prongs two and four of the O’Brien test query whether the challenged 
regulations are narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest.”).   
85. Edwards II, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (“The Court therefore concludes that the 
regulations withstand intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.”).  
86. See Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1005–06, 1007 n.15.  
87. Id. at 1002 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).   
88. Id.  
89. Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014).  
90. Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1003 (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 
525, 566 (2001)).  The State’s goal here is essentially the same as in Kagan, to 
protect tourists and the tourism industry.  Id.; Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 561.  
91. Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1005.  The court also found “puzzling . . . the applicability 
of the exam requirement to specialty tour guides, such as those focused on ghost, 
food or movie tours,” since a general exam would be “ill-suited to ensuring such 
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Beyond a discussion of the ill fit of the regulation regarding the 
District’s interest in consumer protection and quality-control, the 
Edwards court also discussed the lack of evidence of an actual need 
to protect those stated interests.92  Finally, and most importantly, the 
court posed this question: “Perhaps most fundamentally, what 
evidence suggests market forces are an inadequate defense to seedy, 
slothful tour guides?”93 
III. MARKET FORCES ARE AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE   
Can market forces provide an adequate defense to the problems 
sought to be avoided in New Orleans and D.C. by requiring paid tour 
guides to be licensed?94  Yes.  The licenses previously required in 
D.C., and still required in New Orleans, are unnecessary to serve the 
interests asserted by each city, and, therefore, are unconstitutional.95  
Neoclassical economic theory lays the foundation for answering this 
question in the affirmative.96  When applied to tour guides and other 
members of the service industry, this theory demonstrates the 
frivolity of the licensing schemes.97  A prime illustration of 
neoclassical economic mechanisms in the tour guide industry is the 
potency of consumer-rating tools, such as Yelp and TripAdvisor.98  
The ideas discussed here are not limited to one industry; other 
vocations may be subject to similar unnecessary licensing 
requirements in the future if the reasoning in Kagan99 is followed.100  
A. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest.”101 
This profound quote from Adam Smith’s text, The Wealth of 
Nations,102 illustrates the internal market forces that render tour guide 
 
specialty guides are well informed.”  Id. at 1005–06.  There are similar specialty 
guides in New Orleans.  See Kagan I, 957 F. Supp. 2d 774, 775 (E.D. La. 2013).    
92. Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1003.   
93. Id. at 1006–07.  The court then used Yelp and TripAdvisor to illustrate the simple 
but true aphorism: “[B]ad reviews are bad for business.”  Id. at 1007.  
94. Id. at 1006.   
95. Id. at 1009. 
96. See infra Section III.A. 
97. See infra Section III.B. 
98. See infra Section III.B.  
99. See generally Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that New Orleans’ 
licensing requirements for tour guides do not violate the First Amendment).  
100. See infra Section III.C.  
101. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 16 (MetaLibri Digital 2007) (1777), 
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf.  
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licensing, at least in its current form, unnecessary.  As one of the first 
contributors to neoclassical economics,103 it is only appropriate that 
Smith’s words can best be explained through two of the basic 
assumptions of this economic theory.  The first assumption is that 
“[p]eople have rational preferences . . . that can be identified and 
associated with a value.”104  The second is that individuals will act to 
maximize their own utility, and firms, or businesses, will act to 
maximize their profits.105   
Combining the above two facets of neoclassical economics brings 
us to the conclusion that a consumer’s rational, utility-maximizing 
decision to do business only with those firms that have good 
reputations among other consumers106 will act as a monumental 
incentive to firms to act in a way that will attract those consumers.107  
This incentive is, in part, what Adam Smith was referring to when he 
explained the self-interest of the “butcher, the brewer, . . . [and] the 
baker.”108   
There are, of course, a number of critiques of this school of 
thought.  One central criticism is that the assumption of rationality is 
an oversimplification of human behavior, since “[e]conomic agents   
. . . have social, religious, and politico-ideological dimensions,” and 
are “also constrained by the forces of habit, routine and well-
entrenched conventions.”109  Another major criticism is that the 
 
102. Id.  
103. RICHARD D. WOLFF & STEPHEN A. RESNICK, ECONOMICS: MARXIAN VERSUS 
NEOCLASSICAL 10 (1987).  
104. Neoclassical Economics, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Neoclassical_economics (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2016); see also WOLFF & RESNICK, supra note 103, at 7 (“[Neoclassical 
economic theory] assumes that all goods and services are privately owned by 
individuals and that all individuals seek to maximize their satisfaction from 
consuming goods and services. Neoclassical economists proceed to analyze what 
such rationally motivated individuals will do with their property as they maximize 
their satisfaction.”).  
105. Id.; see also David Dequech, Neoclassical, Mainstream, Orthodox, and Heterodox 
Economics, 30 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 279, 280 (2008) (“[N]eoclassical 
economics is characterized by . . . the emphasis on rationality and the use of utility 
maximization as the criterion of rationality . . . .”); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of 
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 
256 (1959).  
106. I.e., those firms that are most likely to actually maximize the consumer’s utility. 
107. I.e., not be “seedy, slothful tour guides.” Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
108. SMITH, supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
109. Hamid Hosseini, The Archaic, the Obsolete and the Mythical in Neoclassical 
Economics, 49 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 81, 84–85 (1990); see also D.M. Nachane, The 
Unity of Science Principle and the ‘Unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Neoclassical 
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notion of rational decision-making to maximize utility or profits 
requires “perfect knowledge,”110 which often does not exist in 
reality.111   
These criticisms, however, are largely inapplicable to the analysis 
presented below. 112  There is little chance of a consumer behaving 
irrationally based on habit or routine when seeking a tour guide 
because it is not likely that the same consumer is going on the same 
vacation and the same tour repeatedly.113  Furthermore, while perfect 
information may not be available to all consumers, the internet114 or 
even a travel agent can provide consumer reviews and feedback, 
which will likely help the consumer make rational decisions.115 
B. Market Forces: The Tour Guide Industry  
Imagine what would happen if tour guides were not required to 
pass written exams and obtain licenses.  Would swindling tour guides 
run rampant, misinforming tourists and cheating them of their 
money?  No.116  It is an unavoidable fact of life that there will always 
be dishonest businessmen and women, but it is also a fact that an 
 
Economics, 43 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 79, 82 (2008) (discussing the Keynesian 
critique and citing Keynes himself as describing the “rationality postulate” as “a 
pretty polite technique” attempting “to deal with the present by distracting from the 
fact that we know very little about the future”). 
110. Neoclassical economic theory assumes that economic agents—producers and 
consumers—have perfect knowledge, meaning they are “so keenly on the alert and 
so well acquainted with one another’s affairs that” there is a clear rational decision 
for each transaction.  Hosseini, supra note 109, at 83 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 112 (8th ed. 1984)).   
111. See, e.g., Hosseini, supra note 109, at 85 (“George Shackle and Ludwig Lackmann 
have long maintained that perfect knowledge is impossible; whereas without it 
rationality and optimizing behavior become impossible.”).  
112. See infra Section III.B.  
113. See, e.g., Ana María Campón et al., Loyalty Measurement in Tourism: A Theoretical 
Reflection, in QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN TOURISM ECONOMICS 13–14 (Á. Matias et 
al. eds., 2013) (“With regard to the tourism sector, Bigné et al. (2005) hold that it is 
difficult to measure loyalty on the basis of repeat purchases because consumption is 
infrequent and customers may prefer to visit new places.”).  
114. Before the advent of consumer-rating websites, and before the widespread 
accessibility of the Internet, there was probably a better argument for the necessity of 
licensing schemes for tour guides since consumer opinions would be passed along 
very slowly, if at all.  
115. See Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Crowen, The End of Asymmetric Information, CATO 
UNBOUND (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.cato-unbound.org/issues/april-2015/end-
asymmetric-information (“Technological developments are giving everyone who 
wants it access to the very best information when it comes to product quality, worker 
performance, . . . [and] many other areas.  These developments will have 
implications for how markets work, how much consumers benefit, and also 
economic policy and the law.”).  
116. See, e.g., Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996, 1003–04 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
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overwhelming majority of cities and states in the United States do not 
require tour guides to pass an exam and acquire a license before 
conducting business.117  When the D.C. Circuit Court wrote its 
opinion in 2014, the court identified only four cities other than New 
Orleans and D.C. that also required licenses for tour guides.118  
According to The Institute for Justice, one of those four cities—
Savannah, Georgia—has since decided to “abandon their licensing 
laws rather than defend them in court,”119 seemingly following in 
Philadelphia’s footsteps.120   
If only a “handful of cities . . . require[] tour guide licenses,”121 
then it logically follows that most cities in the United States do not.122  
This statement may seem redundant, but it must be emphasized 
because the Fifth Circuit would lead you to believe that tourists in 
these unregulated cities are at great risk of being “scammed or put in 
 
117. See, e.g., id. at 1004 n.5.   
Although the District’s brief identified five cities with tour-guide 
licensing requirements—Charleston, SC; New Orleans, LA; New 
York, NY; Savannah, GA; and Philadelphia, PA—Philadelphia 
appears to have abandoned (at least for the time being) any 
intention of enforcing its law. The actual fifth city, Williamsburg, 
Virginia, came to the court’s attention as a result of Appellants’ 
candor and due diligence.  
Id. (citations omitted).   
118. Id.  
119. Robert Everett Johnson, Counterpoint: Tour Guide Licensing is Unconstitutional, 
ST. AUGUSTINE RECORD (Nov. 1, 2015, 12:05 AM), 
http://staugustine.com/opinions/2015-10-31/counterpoint-tour-guide-licensing-
unconstitutional.  
120. Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1004 n.5 (“Philadelphia appears to have abandoned (at least 
for the time being) any intention of enforcing its law.”); see also Tait v. City of 
Philadelphia, 410 F. App’x 506, 509 (3d Cir. 2011). 
The District Court held that the City's claimed inability to enforce 
the Ordinance at this time is equivalent to a promise not to enforce 
the Ordinance, and at oral argument the City went further and 
stated that it ‘disavowed’ enforcement of the Ordinance until it 
announces that a written test will be administered.  
 Id. 
121. Tim Krepp, Tour Guide Licenses Unconstitutional? Maybe!, DC LIKE A LOCAL 
(Sept. 16, 2010, 1:39 PM), http://dclikealocal.com/dclikealocal/2010/9/16/tour-
guide-licenses-unconstitutional-maybe.html.  
122. See, e.g., S.F. Tour Guide Guild, How to Become a Tour Guide, 
http://www.sftgg.org/docs/how-to-become-a-tour-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2016) (“To be a tour guide in San Francisco you don’t need a license or certification 
. . . .”); World Fed’n Tourist Guide Ass’ns, Chicago (and the surrounding 
suburbs), http://www.wftga.org/guideapedia/united-states-america/chicago-and-
surrounding-suburbs (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (“The City of Chicago does not 
license tour guides . . . .”). 
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danger by their tour guides.”123  The mere rarity of license 
requirements for tour guides does not itself prove that licensing is 
unnecessary and unconstitutional.124  The fact that the government 
interest may be achieved through other means does not invalidate a 
regulation, but, as the court in Kagan explained, a regulation is not 
sufficiently narrowly-tailored if the substantial interest could be 
served just as effectively without the regulation.125  The large number 
of cities without licensing requirements serves as undeniable 
evidence that market forces are just as effective as the controversial 
licenses, if not more so.126  
As the Kagan court touted, New Orleans tour guides suffer no 
speech restrictions once they are licensed; they are free to say 
whatever they wish about the city.127  What, then, prevents a tour 
guide from pointing to Basin St. Station and calling it St. Louis 
Cathedral?128  The answer is simple, and it has nothing to do with 
passing an exam, paying a fee, or carrying a license: self-interest.  
Self-interest is what keeps a tour guide from lying or guiding a tour 
unprepared, because if a guide does this, it is inevitable that a tourist 
will notice and decide to warn others of the unsatisfying 
experience.129  As rational economic agents seeking to maximize 
their own utility,130 the others will heed this warning and choose to 
take their business elsewhere—a concept referred to as “dollar-
voting.”131  The tour guide, or tour guide business-owner, is also a 
 
123. Kagan I, 957 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (E.D. La. 2013).  
124. See id. at 784. 
125. Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t satisfie[s] the requirement of 
narrow tailoring so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”) (citing Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citation omitted)).  
126. See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text.  
127. Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 562 (“[T]he New Orleans law in its requirements for a license 
has no effect whatsoever on the content of what tour guides say.”).  
128. Attractions, THE OFFICIAL TOURISM SITE OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 
http://www.neworleansonline.com/neworleans/attractions/attractions.php (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016).   
129. See infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.  
130. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.  
131. Peter Lindsay, Exposing the Invisible Hand: The Roots of Laissez-Faire’s Hidden 
Influence, 37 POLITY 295, 297 (2005). 
Free markets, in turn, are valued on the assumption that they 
allow scarce resources to be allocated in the absence of any public 
sanctioning of what is and what is not a worthy economic activity 
or good . . . emphasiz[ing] the efficiency of allocating resources 
via an unencumbered pricing system in which individual 
consumers direct production through chaotic, uncoordinated 
“dollar-voting.” 
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rational decision-maker seeking to maximize profits, and will seek to 
prevent this, or remedy the problem and gain back consumers’ trust 
and patronage.132  
Evidence of the economic validity of this simple illustration can be 
seen in consumer rating platforms, such as Yelp and TripAdvisor.133  
After going on Southern Hospitality Tours’ “Cocktail and Jazz” tour 
in 2011, Yelp user Lauren M., from Arlington, Virginia, wrote a 
review to express her dissatisfaction:  
 I wouldn't bother with the Cocktail and Jazz tour.  The 
drinks were nothing special and we only heard music at 2 of 
5 venues.  At two venues we didn't even go inside because 
the places were too crowded so we drank our drinks on the 
street.  The tour guide did know his New Orleans history, 
but I would recommend paying $20 for a carriage tour if 
that is what you're looking for.134 
A few months later, Kim W., the owner of Southern Hospitality 
Tours, replied:  
 Thank you for your response.  We have significantly 
changed the tour since you took it based on customer 
feedback.  All of our venues are now much bigger venues 
and all feature live local music.  The tour still includes 
signature cocktails but you now have the choice of a beer or 
well drink at the second and last venue with three signature 
cocktails in between.  We added a lot more history to the 
tour and less walking as well and we can now spend more 
time at each venue.  The tour now ends on Bourbon St.  
Thanks for your comment and helping us make this tour 
better.135  
 
 Id.   
132. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.   
133. See, e.g., YELP, www.yelp.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (proclaiming itself as the 
“best way to find great local businesses”); TRIPADVISOR, www.tripadvisor.com (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016) (helping users “[b]ook your best trip, every trip”).  
134. Lauren M., Southern Hospitality Tours, YELP (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.yelp.com/biz/southern-hospitality-tours-new-orleans.  
135. Kim W., Southern Hospitality Tours, YELP (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.yelp.com/biz/southern-hospitality-tours-new-orleans. 
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This is just one example, but similar interactions regarding different 
tour guide companies can be found on Yelp and TripAdvisor.136  Not 
only do these reviews show the “expressed outrage and contempt that 
would likely befall a less than scrupulous tour guide,”137 they also 
demonstrate the way in which tour guide companies respond: they try 
to fix the problem for the future.138   
Many tour guide companies may be run by people who genuinely 
care about tourists’ experiences, but this is not the only motivator for 
responding to negative feedback.139  Georgios Zervas and Michael 
Luca conducted a Harvard Business study and found “that having an 
extra star on Yelp causes the revenue of a business to rise by 5 to 10 
percent.”140  From this, we can logically conclude that having fewer 
stars on Yelp causes less revenue, which would in turn cause the 
rational, profit-maximizing business-owner to take action.141  This is 
a specific example of the general idea that, “[a] decline in brand 
recognition or a blow to a corporation’s reputation affects a 
corporation’s bottom line and can be as effective a threat . . . as any 
government mandate.”142   
If market mechanisms are as effective as, if not more effective than, 
the licensing regulations at issue in Kagan and Edwards, then those 
regulations are not sufficiently narrowly tailored.143  In this case, the 
 
136. See, e.g., Wanda C., The Original Ghosts of Williamsburg Candlelight Tour, 
TRIPADVISOR (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-
g58313-d1122733-Reviews-
The_Original_Ghosts_of_Williamsburg_Candlelight_Tour-
Williamsburg_Virginia.html#REVIEWS.  Wanda C. went on “The Original Ghosts 
of Williamsburg Candlelight Tour” and expressed her dissatisfaction in a 
TripAdvisor post, stating that she was “disappointed” and her family found the tour 
to be “rather boring.”  Id.  In response to this, “angelaghost,” the manager, asked 
Wanda to contact her through the company’s website so that they could “take steps 
to fix this,” adding that the company “fell short, and that is unacceptable.”  Id.   
137. Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996, 1006–07 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
138. See id.; see also supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.  
139. See supra Section III.A. 
140. Susan Seligson, Yelp Reviews: Can You Trust Them?, BU TODAY (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.bu.edu/today/2013/yelp-reviews-can-you-trust-them; see also Sabah 
Karimi, 5 Ways to Attract More 5-Star Reviews for Your Tour and Activity Business, 
ZOZI (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.zozi.com/advance/blog/5-ways-to-attract-more-
5-star-reviews-for-your-tour-and-activity-business (“70 percent of global consumers 
say online reviews are the second most trusted form of advertising, with word-of-
mouth and recommendations from friends and family being the most trusted . . . .”).  
141. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.   
142. Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus 
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (2015) 
(emphasis added).  
143. See Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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threshold level of effectiveness is not very high to begin with.144  As 
both courts point out, once tour guides are licensed, they are free to 
say whatever they wish.145  It must be conceded that the licensing 
scheme is effective in one area: criminal background checks.146  This 
does not, however, explain the necessity for written and oral exams 
that sometimes contain little to no information that will actually be 
used by the tour guide,147 nor does it explain the need for a licensing 
fee.148  There is no necessity for them, and they have no effect on a 
tour guide’s behavior or a consumer’s experience once the guide is 
licensed, rendering them unconstitutional at the least.149  
C. Speakers Beware 
The debate over requiring what is essentially a “license to speak” is 
not only significant to tour guides: “[a]s we move from an industrial 
to an informational economy, more and more and more Americans 
will earn their livings in occupations that consist primarily in 
speaking,” and “everyone who speaks for a living . . . from 
comedians to consultants to interior designers150 to therapists” will be 
affected.151  
The same economic theories explained above152 apply to these 
professions as well, obviating the need for licenses as a means of 
quality control.153  Take, for example, the case of Janet Cooke, an 
“ex-journalist.”154  In 1980, Cooke wrote an article for The 
Washington Post titled “Jimmy’s World,” a harrowing report about 
an eight-year-old heroin addict.155 Cooke was awarded the Pulitzer 
 
144. See Edwards III, 755 F.3d 996, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
145. See, e.g., Kagan II, 753 F.3d at 562; Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1005.  
146. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-1553 (2011); D.C. MUN. 
REGS. tit. 19, § 1203.1(c) (2010) (amended 2015).   
147. Ghost or movie tours, for example.  See Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1005–06.  
148. The fees do, however, raise revenue, which could explain the vehement argument for 
their “necessity.”  See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
149. See Edwards III, 755 F.3d at 1009. 
150. See, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that state 
license requirement for the practice of non-residential interior design is 
constitutional and not even subject to First Amendment free speech scrutiny).  
151. Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There—and the Court Should Resolve 
Them, 16 ENGAGE 36, 37 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
152. See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
153. See supra Section III.A.  
154. Janet Cooke, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janet_Cooke (last visited Oct. 
31, 2016).  Cooke’s occupation is listed as “ex-journalist.”  Id.  
155. David A. Maraniss, Post Reporter’s Pulitzer Prize Is Withdrawn, WASH. POST, Apr. 
16, 1981, at A1.  
186 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
Prize for her work;156 the only problem was that she fabricated the 
story.157  After this fabrication was discovered, Cooke returned the 
Pulitzer and resigned.158  Cooke’s resignation was not due solely to 
her own disgrace for what she had done;159 consumers (i.e., readers) 
relied on The Washington Post to maximize their utility, which in this 
instance, meant to report the truth.160  The Washington Post, in turn, 
needed readers’ business to maximize their own profits.161  Cooke 
had to resign so the Post could regain credibility and remain 
competitive in the market.162   
In 2013, the Discovery Channel aired a “documentary” entitled 
“Megalodon: The Monster Shark Lives.”163  This so-called 
documentary “strung viewers along as it searched for a mythical 
shark that went extinct millions of years ago.”164  The next year, 
Discovery aired “Megalodon: The New Evidence,” which provided 
no actual evidence.165  Viewers were disappointed, and vocalized that 
disappointment.166  For example, one viewer tweeted: “Dear 
discovery channel, your fake documentary that you are trying to pass 
off as reality is upsetting.”167  In 2015, the head of development at 
Discovery Channel stated that “Shark Week will be focused more on 
science and research this time around,”168 no doubt in an effort to 
keep viewers happy, and, in turn, keep the channel’s “crown jewel” 
profitable.169  
Another, more simplified illustration can be made of a stand-up 
comedian who, like a tour guide, speaks for a living. If George Carlin 
had not been funny, meaning he would not have been able to provide 
consumers with a quality experience, then he would not have been 
 
156. Id.  
157. Id.  
158. Id.  
159. Id. 
160. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
163. Adam Epstein, No More Megalodon: Discovery Channel Promises a More Scientific 
“Shark Week” This Year, QUARTZ (July 6, 2015), http://qz.com/445516/no-more-
megalodon-discovery-channel-promises-a-more-scientific-shark-week-this-year/.  
164. Id. 
165. Id.  
166. Breeanna Hare, Discovery Channel Defends Dramatized Shark Special 
‘Megalodon,’ CNN (Aug. 9, 2013, 7:37 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/07/showbiz/tv/discovery-shark-week-megalodon/. 
167. Id. 
168. Epstein, supra note 163. 
169. Id. 
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able to maximize his profits.170  He would have then had two choices: 
get funnier, or find a new job.  Licenses are not necessary to regulate 
many professions; they regulate themselves.171  
The above examples may seem obvious, but that is the point.  
Consumers react to unsatisfactory experiences and purchases because 
they know that this will cause the producers in the market to react, 
therefore lessening the likelihood of a repeat performance.172  There 
certainly are professions where licensing is appropriate and necessary 
(e.g., medicine and law)173, but the line must be drawn somewhere, 
and the Kagan decision is blurring an already wavering line.174  For 
example, in 2013, the Fourth Circuit upheld a licensing requirement 
for fortune tellers against a First Amendment challenge.175  The 
Fourth Circuit applied one of the “least developed areas of First 
Amendment doctrine,”176 the professional speech doctrine,177 to 
determine whether or not the license requirement constituted a 
violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.178  The court 
likened the licensing in question to the basic “regulatory 
requirements . . . appli[cable] to law [and] medicine.”179  There is a 
clear logical disconnect between regulations in the legal and medical 
professions and regulations in the fortune telling profession.180  
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit applied the professional speech doctrine 
 
170. George Carlin was very funny.  See Melissa Locker, 10 Genius George Carlin Jokes, 
IFC (Sep. 19, 2013), http://www.ifc.com/2013/09/10-genius-george-carlin-jokes 
(“When it comes to comedy, George Carlin sets the gold standard.”).  
171. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.  
172. See e.g., Epstein, supra note 163. 
173. See, e.g., Medical Licensure, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician/medical-licensure.page 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016); Bar Admissions Basic Overview, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/bar_admissions/basic
_overview.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  
174. See generally Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that New Orleans’ 
licensing requirements for tour guides do not violate the First Amendment). 
175. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 561 (4th Cir. 2013).   
176. David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First 
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 843, 843 (2006). 
177. Nicole Brown Jones, Did Fortune Tellers See This Coming? Spiritual Counseling, 
Professional Speech, and the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 639, 649 (2014) 
(“[T]he professional speech doctrine has been applied when there is a ‘collision 
between the power of government to license and regulate those who would pursue a 
profession . . . and the rights of freedom of speech . . . .’”) (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 
472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).   
178. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569–70. 
179. Id. at 570.   
180. Id. 
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after recognizing that “[a]spects of [the plaintiff’s] business are 
clearly . . . for entertainment purposes.”181  What does this mean, 
then, for other entertainers, especially in light of the decision in 
Kagan?182   
More recently, and more dauntingly, in January 2016, South 
Carolina State Representative Mike Pitts introduced the “South 
Carolina Responsible Journalism Registry Law.”183 If the bill 
becomes law: 
[Any] person who in his professional capacity collects, 
writes, or distributes news or other current information for a 
media outlet, including an employee or an independent 
contractor, that is not registered would be fined $25 to $500, 
would be cited with a misdemeanor and could be 
imprisoned up to 30 days, based on the level of offense.184    
Although many doubt this bill will ever come to fruition,185 there is 
still cause for concern, as this is not even the first attempt at statutory 
journalism regulation in recent history,186 and it likely will not be the 
last.187  In Kagan and Edwards, both courts recognized the 
importance of integrity in the industry in question,188 and it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to find someone who does not value 
integrity in journalism.  The same arguments that were made about 
tour guides and the need to protect tourists can be made about 
journalists and the need to protect subscribers and viewers, sending 
First Amendment jurisprudence down a slippery slope.189    
 
181. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
182. See Kagan II, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding the New Orleans licensing 
requirement for tour guides did not violate tour guides’ First Amendment rights). 
183. See Gavin Jackson & Schuyler Kropf, Republican Lawmaker Says Journalists 




184. Id.  
185. Id. (“Charles Bierbauer . . . was one of several media representatives in the state who 
said Pitts’ proposal had no chance of ever becoming reality.”).  
186. Michigan Republican Senator Bruce Patterson introduced a similar bill in 2010, 
although the registry in that case would have been voluntary.  See Jana Winter, 
Michigan Considers Law to Register Journalists, FOX NEWS (May 28, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/05/28/michigan-considers-law-license-
journalists.html.  
187. See id.; see also Jackson & Kropf, supra note 183.  
188. See supra Sections II.B, II.C.  
189. Winter, supra note 186. 
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As consumers, we all want what we pay for: reliable information 
about a new city, a spooky ghost tour, a comedic performance, an 
education, a revealing documentary, reliable journalism.190  As 
journalists, tour guides, teachers, and speakers, we want the freedom 
to express ourselves without first having to take an exam or join a 
registry.191  Luckily, market forces accommodate the wishes of 
consumers and producers, thereby obviating the need for costly and 
time-consuming government regulations that do much to restrict 
freedom of expression, and little to advance any valid state goal.192   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unnecessary government regulations are frustrating no matter what 
is being regulated.  Requiring tour guides to be licensed is both an 
unnecessary regulation and one that infringes upon citizens’ freedom 
of speech.193  Requiring someone to pay for and pass a written exam 
about the history of the city in which they intend to work will not 
ensure quality control in the tourism industry,194 so it is a good thing 
that market forces are able to pick up the slack.195   
Because businesses, such as tour guide companies, are motivated 
by profit maximization,196 and because consumers are motivated by 
utility maximization,197 quality control is almost a non-issue.198  This 
is especially true when rational consumers have access to ratings and 
reviews through websites like Yelp and TripAdvisor.199  Market 
forces work in essentially the same manner in industries such as 
entertainment and journalism, but the holding in Kagan poses a threat 
to those industries as well.200  An extension of regulatory schemes 
like those seen in Edwards and Kagan201 to other “professional 
speaker” industries would be both wasteful and offensive to the First 
Amendment.202 
 
190. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra Section III.B. 
192. See discussion supra Part III. 
193. See supra Section II.C. 
194. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
196. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  
199. See supra notes 131–39 and accompanying text.  
200. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
201. See supra Sections II.B, II.C. 
202. See discussion supra Section III.C.  
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Bill Main, owner of Segs in the City and original plaintiff in 
Edwards, perfectly summarized the debate, and the reason for his 
success in D.C., in four short sentences: “There is no need for these 
regulations.  We will regulate ourselves.  We have competitors.  They 
will regulate themselves.”203   
 
 
203. The Heritage Foundation, D.C. Tour Guide Fights City Regulations, YOUTUBE (Oct. 
6, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hqnv4A9av4.  
